4:Grajdanzev--162-163 S-4 (no date) 1942 Formosans
116, 171, 632, 641. 177.64 Japan
636.64

"The municipal or village councils have from 8 to 40 deputies (according to the population), half of whom are appointed by the government and half elected. The electorate is made up of male Empire subjects who have attained the age of twenty-five years, who are not dependent, who have lived continuously for at least six months in that particular locality and pay at least five yen in municipal or village taxes (house tax, land tax, or business tax). [163]

Thus it is clear that the only places in which there is some semblance of elections are the cities or villages. As has already been pointed out, the small landowners in Taiwan possess chiefly dry land and the majority of them own less than one ko. But the village land tax from one ko of dry land is less than five yen and consequently the majority of owners, as well as all tenants and workers, have no right to vote. We have no data for Taiwan, but the example of Korea shows that by this device two per cent of the population—the Japanese—form the majority of the electorate."

634 Each county (called gun in the five provinces and shicho in the three districts) was administered by an official whose duty was to police the county. The chief of a county supervised the town and village governments under him.

632 623 City governments were responsible directly to the provincial government in which they were situated, while towns and villages were responsible to the provincial government through the county administration. Mayors of cities, as well as chiefs of town and heads of villages, were all appointed by the governor-general. There was an assembly in each city, town, and village. The city assembly had a membership ranging from twenty to forty and the town and village assemblies had eight to twenty members. One-half of the members of the local assemblies were appointed by the governor of the province and one-half were elected by the qualified electorate. The city assemblies functioned in the same manner as the provincial assemblies. They could act on the city budget and tax matters. They also elected six members to the city council which took the place of the assembly when the latter was not in session. The governor of a province or the mayor of a city held the veto power over the acts of the assemblies. The town and village assemblies were consultative agencies, authorized only "to announce their opinions in

630 answer to questions submitted to them by
633 the local government authorities." The heads of towns and villages had no obligation to seek or to follow the advice of local assemblies. The governor-general could dissolve the assemblies at any level at will.

631 The exceedingly limited extent of "self-
666 government,"[1] which the Japanese had much
641 publicized, was further minimized by the franchise. Suffrage was granted to all self-supporting male Japanese subjects 25 years of age or older, resident in the relevant districts for more than six months, who have been paying for six months or longer a minimum local tax of ¥ 5.00 a year.[6] Formosan Chinese were counted as Japanese subjects, but because the majority of them paid a city, town, or village tax under ¥ 5.00 a year,[7] the number

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6. Naito, op. cit., p. 73.

7. "The small landowners in Taiwan possess chiefly dry land and the majority of them own less than one ko (chio = 2.39 acres). But the village land tax from one ko of dry land is less than five yen and consequently the majority of owners, as well as all tenants and workers, have no right to vote." Grajdanzev, op. cit., p. 163.

1 [During Japanese occupation from 1895 to 1945 -- Analyst]

634 following hsien are on the western slope of the mountain ranges: from north to south, Taipei, Taoyuan, Hsinchu, Miaoli, Taichung, Changhua, Nantou, Yunlin, Chiayi, Tainan, Kaohsiung, and Pingtung. Three hsien cover the eastern slope of the mountains; these are Yilan, Hualien, and Taitung. The Pescadores form a separate hsien, Penghu. Two of the five municipalities, Keelung and Taipei, are located at the northern tip of the island, the remaining three, Taichung, Tainan, and Kaohsiung, are on the western side of the island. The scenic resort, Yangmingshan, where President Chiang Kai-shek resides, is a northern suburb of Taipei and forms a special administrative district.

632 The sixteen hsien are each divided into chen (towns) and hsiang (groups of villages or rural districts). Chen and hsiang are further subdivided, respectively, into li (wards) and ts'un (villages). The five municipalities are dividied into ch'ü (districts or sections) and ch'ü are divided into li. A ts'un (village) is composed of 100-200 households and a li (ward) of 150-300. The smallest community organization is called lin (neighborhood) and consists of 6-15 households. In the province of Taiwan there are 82,290 lin which form 3,066 ts'un and 3,489 li. These ts'un and li combine to form 77 chen and 235 hsiang. [3]

631 635 At the head of the provincial government is the governor, who is the chairman of the Provincial Council. The Taiwan Provincial Council is composed of twenty-one members, six of whom are concurrently commissioners of provincial departments.

3. Chung-hua Min-kuo Nien-chien [Yearbook of the Republic of China 1953], Taipei, 11/30/53, p.643.

52:Barclay S-5 (no date)1954 ADI Formosa ADI

spread local support. Their program to govern the countryside directly was a recognized failure as early as 1898.[10]

Starting with the issuance of *pao-chia* regulations in that year, the policy was revised with a view to getting less ambitious results, but more quickly. These were rules of conduct imposed on inhabitants of villages and smaller towns, under the threat of punitive action against the whole community. Virtually all Taiwanese outside the Aborigine Territory (with special provisions applying to certain cities) were assigned to household groups (*chia*), which were in turn grouped into village units (*pao*) for supervision. Responsibility for law observance and public order was allotted jointly among the households of each village. Positions of authority, carrying explicitly defined duties, were conferred on heads of prominent (i.e., wealthy and influential) families.

The system was based on a shrewd practical knowledge of those customary obligations that were most binding among Taiwanese. It was a move toward fitting the treatment of opposition to its roots instead of to its symptoms. By making the regulation of villages follow lines of kinship and property, these measures in effect were insinuated into the indigenous social structure of the population.

The rules placed a multitude of specific duties upon each *chia* as a group. The *chia*, through its head, was responsible for reporting all events such as births and deaths occurring within it, for reporting and controlling all movements of persons in and out of its area along with the conduct of the permanent residents; it put into effect the earnest health and sanitation rules that were often promulgated; it mobilized labor from its ranks for road-building and irrigation projects as directed from above; it was required to disseminate instructions for crop improvement and soil maintenance, bearing its own expenses; it supplied men for auxiliary police service, supported its own school facilities, assessed fines among its members, collected many taxes, and could be called upon to enforce additional rules decreed by prefectural governors.[11] These latter features in fact proved so attractive in avoiding the costs of more formal administration that the Japanese kept the regulations in full force throughout the entire span of their rule.

[10] Yanaihara, Tadao (1929), pp. 220-223.

[11] See OPNAV, Civil Affairs Handbook, *Takao Province* (1944), pp. 49-51; also Hsü Tzu-wei (1946), p. 160 ff. This latter author calls the *pao-chia* system "the most effective instrument for destroying organized Chinese resistance to the Japanese."

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The arrangement had more than savings in the expenses of civil government to recommend it. It gave the new regime a channel of authority reaching into every village, however small. Perceiving the value of this, the Japanese took care not to let the system lapse through neglect. They kept a close watch over its functioning by means of a large and reliable force of their own police. More important, by insisting on rigorous enforcement of the regulations, they launched the *pao-chia* organization into full-scale and sustained operation from the beginning.[12] With the supervision of a trusted constabulary, it functioned through the medium of prior obligations and loyalties that were already present in every community, without the need to nurture affection for the central regime among the population.

Such a system—when it works—is a most efficient way of maintaining peace and order in a society already strongly bound by local custom. The Japanese originally adopted it as an improvement over the use of force, but never abandoned coercion in its operation. They merely utilized the structure of *pao* and *chia* to apply sanctions against wrongdoing more selectively and less frequently. Penalties fell on those persons in positions to exercise a deterrent influence on others.

As a further by-product, the refined coercive aspect helped to lessen the rewards that had to be granted for Taiwanese collaboration. This was important, for in rural areas such a form of control lends itself readily to keeping the avenues to individual betterment within an accustomed scope.[13] The impressive agricultural improve-

[12] A system like this one can function only where there are strong local solidarities. It turns communities into separate compartments for administration. This fact may be responsible for some of its success in maintaining order, for it inhibits organized opposition to established government from growing to any large scale. But the considerable success of the *pao-chia* system in Japanese hands cannot be accounted for by these divisive effects. They were also present in Nationalist and Imperial China, and there only helped to divide the society so far that no central administration was possible.

The essential difference was that in Taiwan the Japanese adopted it as an opportunity not for avoiding local government, but for effectuating central control over local affairs. Besides using it to enforce a minimum degree of legal conformity, they intermixed a host of other functions already alluded to. In addition, the Japanese incorporated a regular scheme of favors to be bestowed on active collaborators, in the nature of education, business opportunity, and appointment to government posts, and thus by-passed the usual effect of family connections in filling lower positions of authority.

[13] In later years many educated Taiwanese protested, and correctly so, that it worked as a levelling mechanism to impede all of them from rising very far above the status of peasants. In order to serve a central government at all, and not be merely a loose alliance of towns and villages, such a system must offer inducements to a gentry class for cooperation: this complaint by frustrated persons with schooling should properly be

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ments, health program, and construction for public works all depended on generous amounts of labor. Without such cheap incentives to mobilize this labor, these projects could not have been pursued so effectively.

As obvious as these advantages of "indirect rule" may be, it should be as clear that it is a poor vehicle for introducing social change. The more it is used to wield authority, the stronger and more resistant to change it can become; the more it is undermined by altering local relationships that sustain it, the less remains of its usefulness. Hence, from adoption of this scheme initially as an expedient to "pacify" the island, Japanese authorities acquired a positive interest in preserving the same set of agrarian institutions that had existed in Taiwan before their arrival.

Thus they abandoned the idea of reorganizing the rural society—primarily because they tried and failed, but also because as it stood it gave them the best access to regulation of the agricultural population and farming practices. It was in some respects a ready-made instrument for exerting the necessary control with the least disturbance of customary affairs, having in the past enabled the various parties to the export trade to prosper at the expense of farmers. For better coordination of their policies, Japanese gradually did erect a more formal type of government administration, but the basis of the system in rural areas was not greatly affected by this modification.

The Impact of Improvements in Agriculture

The Japanese who were charged with remodeling Taiwan's economy gave first priority to long-range investments around the fringes of agriculture. The rural economy was already geared to exchange food and related products for special capital services. Certain of these services were soon altered under Japanese influence. Positions that provided them, or that could usurp them, gradually began to be occupied by Japanese nationals—official, private, and always an indistinct class in between that wielded quasi-official sanctions.

Those innovations that worked their way into agriculture were directed chiefly to raising crop yields per unit of tilled land. Another avenue of increasing the total agricultural product was by extending

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construed as a lament that there were few opportunities for advancement outside the rural villages and towns dominated by petty gentry. Discontent from this source bore few signs of being the awakening of a popular movement for independence among the Taiwanese, as it is sometimes represented. See Hsü Tze-wei (1946), p. 161 ff.

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631 urban centers as 'administrative units. The island is presently divided into sixteen counties and five province-controlled municipalities. Under them are various districts, townships, and villages.[12]

632 634 666 Within this framework of centralized control is carried out the program of encouraging local self-government. As of May 6, 1951, all the twenty-one mayors and county magistrates had been successively elected to their respective offices by popular vote.[13] Besides, there are 6,304 village and *li* (urban units akin to wards) assemblies learning self-government by doing. Representing them in township and district assemblies are some 8,024 village and *li* delegates.[14] On county and municipal levels are some 541 popularly elected councilmen.[15] Of an estimated 2,650,000 men and women of twenty years of age and over who are qualified to vote, some 2,416,072 had registered.[16]

647 Along with the development in local self-government has been an increase in the participation of local inhabitants in the management of their provincial affairs. It may be recalled that under the Japanese, of 84,559 government personnel in 1945, 55.53 per cent were Taiwanese, and the rest Japanese.[17] In June 1950 the total number of govern-

[12] See Provincial Government of Taiwan, *Report on Administrative Reorganization*, Taipeh, 1949; also Democratic Publications Association, *Taiwan Reconstruction* (Taipeh, 1950), Vol. 1, pp. 1–12.

[13] The Broadcast of Voice of Free China, Taipeh, April 28, 1951 reported the conclusion of nineteen local elections with the remaining two to be completed by May 6, 1951.

[14] April 1948 figures. Also see *Taiwan Reconstruction*, cited note 12 *supra*, pp. 7–12. The terms of office of the delegates have since been extended by the National Government to such time as "formal assemblies shall be constituted."

[15] *Ibid.*

[16] 1947 figure. See *Taiwan Reconstruction*, cited note 12 *supra*, p. 7.

[17] For a breakdown of government person-

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